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Abstract—With the widespread use of biometric systems, the
demographic bias problem raises more attention. Although many
studies addressed bias issues in biometric verification, there
are no works that analyze the bias in presentation attack
detection (PAD) decisions. Hence, we investigate and analyze
the demographic bias in iris PAD algorithms in this paper. To
enable a clear discussion, we adapt the notions of differential
performance and differential outcome to the PAD problem. We
study the bias in iris PAD using three baselines (hand-crafted,
transfer-learning, and training from scratch) using the NDCLD-
2013 [18] database. The experimental results point out that
female users will be significantly less protected by the PAD, in
comparison to males.
Index Terms—PAD bias, iris PAD, differential performance.
I. INTRODUCTION
Biometric recognition systems like face, iris, or fingerprint
have gained wide deployment within various application fields.
This has raised two significant questions. One is concerned
with the security of recognition systems against presentation
attacks. The other is related to fairness, i.e., if the system
performs the same for every different demographic group.
General presentation attacks include printed images, re-
playing videos, synthetic images. Iris presentation attack also
contains textured contact lenses. Several researchers have
already addressed these PAD problem, e.g., face PAD [7], [16],
[23] and iris PAD [2].
Demographic bias in face recognition was discussed by [11],
[19], [25]. Prior works on this issue indicated that face recog-
nition systems obtained inherently a lower performance for
certain demographic groups [11], [19]. For example, females
are more challenging to recognize compared to males [19].
However, no previous works address demographic bias in PAD
decisions. As iris recognition has become increasingly popular,
e.g., iris recognition technology is deployed on consumer
smartphones, we address the demographic bias issues in iris
PAD systems in this work.
Howard et al. [11] defined four recognition related terms to
facilitate demographic bias research. We adapt and reuse two
of these terms to investigate the demographic bias in PAD
systems: 1) Differential Performance represents a difference
in the bona fide or attack decision distribution between specific
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Research and the Arts within their joint support of the National Research
Center for Applied Cybersecurity ATHENE.
demographic groups independent of any decision threshold,
2) Differential Outcome describes a difference in Attack
Presentation Classification Error Rate (APCER) or Bonafide
Presentation Classification Error Rate (BPCER) rates between
different demographic groups relative to a decision threshold.
We utilize these terms to demonstrate our experiments and
examine the bias in Sec.IV and Sec.V.
This work presents the first analysis of demographic bias in
PAD systems (of any modality). Specifically, we study gender
demographic bias in both hand-crafted and deep learning-
based iris PAD algorithms. This is done under the variation of
the training data bias scenarios. We point out that the PAD
decisions tend to be significantly less accurate for female
subjects in most of the experimental setups.
II. RELATED WORK
a) Bias in Biometric Systems: Danks et al. [3] defined
the five types of algorithmic biases: 1) training data bias,
2) algorithmic focus bias, 3) algorithmic processing bias,
4) transfer context bias, 5) interpretation bias. The study
of algorithmic bias in autonomous systems has caused re-
searchers to think about bias in biometric systems. Despite
the improved performance of biometric recognition systems
such as fingerprint, iris or face, the fairness of the recognition
systems is still questionable. The current processes in biomet-
ric systems include (among others) recognition, classification
and presentation attack detection. Biometric recognition is
a technology that can identify or verify a person by us-
ing biometric information [14], [15]. For example, facial or
iris recognition systems compute a similarity score between
subjects from images or a sequence of video frames. The
classification here refers to assigning demographics or other
labels to biometric samples [4]. Presentation attack refers to
using a presentation to fool the system in an effort to induce
an incorrect decision such as using printed images or display
videos. In contrast, presentation attack detection systems are
expected to automatically determine such attacks [12], [22].
Drozdowski et al. [5] summarized an overview of the topic
of algorithmic bias in the context of biometrics and also
contributed a comprehensive survey of the existing literature
on biometric bias estimation and mitigation. According to
recent studies, biometric recognition and classification systems
do not perform equally well in different demographic groups.
Several face recognition relevant studies indicated that the
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female, Black, and younger (18−30y.o.) cohorts are inherently
more difficult to recognize [11], [19]. Such phenomena that
recognition systems have a lower performance for specific
demographic groups is denoted as demographic bias. The
study of demographic bias provides a chance to find the
recognition system problems and mitigate the biases.
b) Bias in PAD systems: Many studies have already
pointed demographic bias in face or fingerprint recognition
systems [11], [19], [20], [27] and obtained similar conclusions.
Moreover, there is one study that experimentally related the
bias to biometric attacks, namely the face morphing attack
[26]. Garcia et al. [26] suggested that morphing attacks are
much more successful for Asian females. However, the authors
did not study bias in attack detection performance. Since iris
biometric features are deployed in many security scenarios, the
decision bias in the processes involved must be analyzed and
minimized. Unfortunately, no previous works experimentally
addressed the demographic bias in PAD systems in general, or
the iris PAD specifically. The primary difficulty is limited data
resources. Czajka et al. [2] summarized iris PAD databases.
Parts of the databases cannot be shared due to information
protection, others were collected many years ago and are un-
realistically simple. The rest of the databases contained almost
no demographic information. In Sec.IV, we find that only one
database, NDCLD-2013 [18], can be used to investigate the
demographic bias. Even this database also has an imbalanced
number of attack samples of males and females. Despite the
limited database availability, the demographic bias in iris PAD
is an open issue and is of great interest. With the widespread
use of iris recognition technology, we believe the bias problem
needs to be analyzed to enable future mitigation efforts.
III. IRIS PRESENTATION ATTACK DETECTION
Iris recognition systems are susceptible to the presentation
attacks, like printed iris images, replaying videos, or contact
lenses. As a result, numerous iris PAD solutions have been
proposed to target iris vulnerability issues [6], [9]. Czajka et
al. [2] summarized the state-of-the-art iris PAD algorithms
in detecting different categories of attack. Various iris PAD
frameworks are grouped into hand-crafted and deep-learning-
based methods. Hand-crafted features such as Local Binary
Pattern (LBP) [8], [21], [28], Binarized statistical image fea-
tures (BSIF) as well as their variations have been the research
focal points until 2015 and made a remarkable contribution to
iris PAD problems. After that, with the rapid development and
application of deep learning in multiple domains, especially,
computer vision field, neural-network-based PAD methods
showed up out of nowhere. However, the deeper the network
structure e.g., VGG16 [24], the higher the computational
needs. Such algorithms with high computational requirements
are hard to deploy in mobile devices. Therefore, Howard et
al. [10] released two new MobileNet models: MobileNetV3-
Large and MobileNetV3-Small to target high and low resource
use cases. We utilize the MobileNetV3-Small structure to be
one of our PAD baselines.
To investigate the effects of demographic bias on different
types of iris PAD systems. These systems are based on 1)
hand-crafted features, 2) transfer learning of a general-purpose
pre-trained network, 3) a trained from scratch network with
computationally-efficient. We use the following baselines to
examine the differential performance and differential outcome:
1) LBP + SVM: LBP [8] has been proposed to address
the texture-based classification tasks. We adapt the LBP
feature in conjunction with a Support Vector Machine
(SVM) [1] using a linear kernel to detect the presentation
attacks. The threshold, which determines the label of the
iris image, is chosen based on the development subset.
Finally, the trained SVM model with a specific threshold
is used to make a decision in the testing set, whether the
iris image is bona fide or attack.
2) VGG-16 + PCA + SVM: VGG-16 [24] is a convolu-
tional neural network for image classification. Consider-
ing that VGG-16 is one of the most widely used feature
extractors, we utilize the pre-trained VGG-16 to encode
iris features. After extraction of VGG-16 features, a lin-
ear dimensionality reduction technique, Principal Com-
ponent analysis (PCA), is used to project the extracted
feature from each iris image with 7×7×512 dimension
into a 128 dimensional sub-space. Similar to LBP, those
lower-dimensional features are fed to SVM [1] with a
linear kernel and make a prediction (bona fide or attack)
based on the threshold choosing from development set.
3) MobileNetV3-Small: We use MobileNetV3-Small [10]
as a network structure to train from scratch. The
contrast-enhanced full iris images in the training set
are fed to the MobileNetV3-Small model. Again, the
threshold is picked up to the development set and used
to predict the label of iris image (bona fide and attack).
In this stage, we use the early stopping criteria to stop
training once there is no improvement in 5 epochs. The
batch size is set to 16, limited by the GPU memory.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
In this experiment, we use the NDCLD-2013 database
[18] including textured contact lens attack collected by the
University of Notre Dame. The detailed iris image capture
information has been published in [18]. Briefly, this database
contained 5100 images of 330 subjects, which acquired with
a LG4000 and an IrisGuard AD100 iris capture device. At
the time of the acquisition, Doyle et al. [18] have divided the
database into training and testing subsets, which was guar-
anteed to have an even distribution of genders and ethnicity.
Nonetheless, we demonstrate experiments only in one database
and only on the gender cohort. The reasons are:
1) The number of the public iris PAD database is much less
than the face and iris recognition databases. Due to the
awareness of privacy security, demographic information
is more difficult to collect. To our knowledge, only
NDCLD-2013 [18] and NDCLD-2015 [17] database
had demographic information. While the NDCLD-2013
included gender, race and age categories, the NDCLD-
2015 had gender and eye color information.
2) There are only two female subjects with attack samples
in the NDCLD-2015 database. Similarly, the eye color
was largely unbalanced in this database. Therefore, we
have to disregard the NDCLD-2015 database, though
we believe that the impact of eye color bias in iris PAD
systems is very interesting and worth the investigation.
3) As shown in Fig. 1, blue (BF-NL) denotes the number
of subjects wearing no contact lens, green (BF-SL) is
the number of subjects wearing the soft lenses and
green (attack) is the number of subjects wearing the
textured lenses. It should be noticed that race/ethnicity
and age categories are unbalanced: 1) no attack samples
in Black and Asian categories, 2) unbalance age groups
(18−30y.o.), and (30−70y.o.). Therefore, for statistical
significance, we only analyze the demographic bias over
gender.
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Fig. 1: Subject-specific distribution of the demographic vari-
ables by different types of representation in database NDCLD-
2013 [18]. BF-NL is the bona fide iris image, BF-SL is the
iris image with the soft lenses, which is also reported as bona
fide, Attack is the iris image with textured lenses.
Given the limited data resources, we are only able to study
gender demographics in iris PAD systems. Two sub-database
LG4000 and AD100 are combined into one database. Train-
test-split is defined in [18]. A summary of the training and
testing samples for each type of representation can be found in
Tab.I. Additionally, we split the training subset into identity-
disjoint training (80%) and development (20%) sets. In this
study, soft lens iris images are used as bona fide samples.
Gender Male Female
Type BF-NL BF-SL Attack BF-NL BF-SL Attack
# Training 600 600 920 600 600 280
# Testing 250 250 370 250 250 130
.
TABLE I: Number of images used for training and testing per
gender. Training and test sets are subject-disjoint. A total of
5100 iris images are used in this study.
For gender demographics, two experiments are conducted.
Because subjects cannot be balanced in 5-fold, we repeat
each experiment 5 times to replace the 5-fold cross-validation
and both experiments are subject-disjoint. The first experiment
measures the iris PAD performance on males versus females.
Specifically, the training and development set contains iris
images from both male and female subjects. Then, we sep-
arately evaluate males and females set. The result from the
first experiment can be found in Tab.II. In addition, we report
the attack and bona fide decision distribution in the gender
cohort from three iris PAD baselines to analyze the differential
performance mentioned in Sec.I (see Fig.2, Fig.3, Fig.4). The
second experiment investigates the influence of the training
subset on iris PAD performance, which means that we use iris
images from one gender as a training and development set.
For example, we train a model by using only male data from
the training set and compute a threshold by fixing APCER
at 0.01% in the male development set. Then, this model
and threshold are applied separately to males and females
testing set. Subsequently, we are able to analyze the outcome
differences in the scenarios where one gender is exclusively
used for training and threshold assignment. The detailed results
of three PAD methods from this experiment can be found in
Tab.III, Tab.IV and Tab.V.
The following metrics are used to measure the iris PAD
algorithm performance:
• Attack Presentation Classification Error Rate
(APCER): The proportion of attack images incorrectly
classified as bona fide smples.
• Bonafide Presentation Classification Error Rate
(BPCER): The proportion of bonafide images incorrectly
classified as attack samples.
• Half Total Error Rate (HTER): corresponds to the
average of BPCER and ACPER.
The APCER, BPCER, and HTER that we report are
calculated on the same threshold, which chosen by fixing
APCER at 0.01% in the development subset. The APCER
and BPCER follows the standard definition presented in
the ISO/IEC 30107-3 [13].
V. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze the experimental results de-
scribed in Sec.IV. First, the difference in bona fide and
attack PAD decision distribution between males and females,
independent of any threshold, is demonstrated to measure
the differential performance. Second, a difference in BPCER
and APCER between males and females regarding a specific
threshold is discussed to examine the differential outcome.
a) Differential Performance in the PAD decision distri-
bution: The ideal distribution of PAD decision is that the
decision of the attack samples is close to zero and the decision
of the bona fide samples is close to one. In this subsection,
we represent the PAD decision distributions between the
gender cohort, which are generated by three algorithms: LBP,
MobileNetV3-Small, and VGG-16 method. First, Fig.2 shows
that most bona fide decisions of males are distributed between
0.7 to 1.0 by LBP method. In contrast, the attack and the bona
fide decisions of females are relatively difficult to separate.
Second, deep-learning-based algorithms obtain a much better
performance compared to the LBP method. As shown in
Fig.3 and Fig.4, the attack and bona fide decisions generated
by MobileNetV3-Small and VGG-16 baselines are relatively
separated. Although both gender cases achieved good results,
we find out that there is still a small difference in the PAD
decision distribution. By observing the zoomed region (in Fig.
3) in MobileNetV3-Small distribution, we notice that male
decisions are denser. Moreover, the female cohort performs
slightly worse than males, which is noted by the smaller gap
between the attack and the bona fide distribution from VGG-
16 (see Fig.4). Together, those evidences point out that female
presentation subjects are potentially more difficult to detect by
iris PAD systems.
Fig. 2: PAD Decision Distribution by LBP method between
bona fide (green) and attack (red) on gender demographic. The
female’s PAD decision distribution is less separable.
Fig. 3: PAD Decision Distribution from MobileNetV3-Small
method between bona fide (green) and attack (red) on gender
demographic.
b) Differential Outcome in APCER and BPCER: As
shown in Tab.II, both hand-crafted-based and neural network-
based algorithms performed worse on the females than males.
This finding is consistent with the results of gender cohort
researches in face recognition systems [11], [19]. LBP method
performs significantly worse on females. The BPCER of the
LBP method on females (42.60%) is much higher than on
males (21.85%) with the same number of bona fide images in
the testing set. MobileNetV3-Small and VGG-16 obtain higher
APCER on females, but, the same BPCER on both cohorts.
Excluding the gender bias effect, one of the possible reasons is
due to a small number of female attack samples in the training
data as described in [3].
Fig. 4: PAD Decision Distribution from VGG-16 method
between bona fide (green) and attack (red) on gender demo-
graphic. The decision gap of female samples between bona
fides and attacks are smaller than that of males.
The results of the second experiment possess more infor-
mation about the nature of the discrepancy. In most cases,
better testing performances are achieved on the trained gender
cohort when training exclusively on males or females. Also,
the LBP method’s performance indicates the significant error
increase when training only on mixed data (males + females)
than training on males/females in Tab.III. One possible reason
is that fewer data cause the underfit or overfit of the classifier.
As shown in Tab. III, even if the female samples have been
learned, the female group performs worse than males. Hence,
the LBP method shows that it is more difficult to decide if
a female subject is bona fide or attack. Besides, the VGG-
16 method demonstrates a much worse generalizability on
the female cohort (Tab.V). The model, which is trained only
by female samples, marks male attack samples as bona fide
images. MobileNetV3-Small (Tab.IV) provide the consistent
generalizability of the females with the VGG-16 method.
There is still a possibility that iris PAD error on females can
be reduced by merely changing the distribution of the female
samples. In general, we notice that different PAD solutions
perform significantly better on male samples, even in some
cases where females samples are exclusively used for training.
Metric LBP MobileNetV3-Small VGG-16Male Female Both Male Female Both Male Female Both
APCER 12.70 8.46 11.6 8.11 9.23 8.40 12.43 16.15 13.40
BPCER 31.00 42.6 36.8 0.20 0.20 0.20 0 0 0
HTER 21.85 25.53 24.2 4.16 4.72 4.30 6.22 8.08 6.7
TABLE II: Results of three iris PAD methods. The training
and development set comprise of both males and females
samples. The threshold is chosen by fixing APCER at 0.01%
in development set. Then, the evaluation is applied on males,
females and mixed testing set separately. The bold number
denotes the worst results. All HTER results indicate that the
female samples are harder to classify.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we address the demographic bias problem in
iris PAD systems. Since no previous work discussed bias in
PAD, we adapt two terms used for verification bias (differential
performance and outcome) to analyze the demographic bias on
LBP
Train Male Female
Test Male Female Both Male Female Both
APCER 14.59 16.92 15.2 14.32 16.15 14.78
BPCER 32.00 43.80 39.70 60.60 67.00 63.80
HTER 23.29 30.36 27.45 37.46 41.58 38.29
TABLE III: Results of the LBP methods. The training set and
development set contain iris images of only one gender. The
evaluation is performed on males, females and mixed gender,
separately. Training on female cohort achieves much worse
HTER than training on males. One possible reason is that
Female cohort has less subjects.
MobileNetV3-Small
Train Male Female
Test Male Female Both Male Female Both
APCER 2.16 7.69 3.60 44.32 10.76 35.6
BPCER 2.00 0 1.00 6.00 7.60 6.80
HTER 2.08 3.85 2.30 25.16 9.18 21.20
TABLE IV: Results of the MobileNetV3-Small methods. The
training set and development set contain iris images of only
one gender. The evaluation is performed on males, females
and mixed gender, separately.
VGG-16
Train Male Female
Test Male Female Both Male Female Both
APCER 18.38 70.77 29.80 100 13.08 75.80
BPCER 0 0 0 0 0 0
HTER 9.19 35.39 14.90 50.00 6.54 37.90
TABLE V: Results of the VGG-16 methods. The training set
and development set contain iris images of only one gender.
The evaluation is performed on males, females and mixed
gender, separately.
PAD performance. Two kinds of experiments are designed to
investigate demographic bias in iris PAD accuracy, as well
as the impact of the training data bias. The results achieved
by three PAD baselines showed a significant difference in the
performance and outcome of the algorithms between male and
female samples in most experimental setups.
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